



REMARKS

Upon the Present

Negotiations of Peace.

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REMARKS

Upon the Present

Negotiations of Peace

Begun between

BRITAIN

AND

FRANCE.

*Let Men turn this Proceeding which way they
please, they will not find such an Example in
either Christian or Prophane History.*

Fable of the Lion's Share.

LONDON,

Printed in the Year 1711.

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BRITAIN

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By the Author of the
"Fable of the Lion's Share"

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REMARKS

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Negotiations of Peace, &c.

HER Majesty, in her Declaration of War against France, assign'd, among other Causes for it, ' the unjust Usurpations of the ' French King, who had taken possession of a ' great part of the Spanish Dominions; and in her Letter to the States, to acquaint them with ' the afflicting ' News of the Death of King William, she was pleas'd to assure them, That she wou'd maintain all the ' Alliances that had been made by her said most Dear ' Brother.

By the first *Grand Alliance*, dated the 9th Day of December, 1689. his Majesty King William did promise, ' That in case the King of Spain should die ' without lawful Issue, he wou'd with all his Forces ' assist his Sacred Imperial Majesty, or his Heirs, in ' taking possession of the Spanish Monarchy lawfully be- ' longing to that House.

And, by the *second Grand Alliance*, dated September 7th, 1701. his Majesty of Great Britain further engag'd, That no Peace should be made, till an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction was obtain'd to the Emperor, for his Pretension to the Spanish Monarchy. There were also two other Articles in this Alliance, not improper to be mentioned: One was, 'That Care shou'd be taken to hinder the French from getting possession of the Spanish Indies, and sailing thither on account of Traffique, or any Pretence whatsoever. The other was, 'That the Confederates should faithfully communicate their Designs to one another, and not treat of Peace, unless jointly, and with the common Advice of the other Parties.'

These were some of the Articles of those Alliances which her Majesty assur'd the Dutch she wou'd maintain. She oblig'd herself also, by the Treaty with Portugal, to assist that King in giving possession of all the Spanish Monarchy to King Charles. And in the article the Sixth. League with the Duke of Savoy her Majesty acknowledg'd the Right of his Royal Highness to the Spanish Monarchy, next after the House of Austria, and promis'd, That she wou'd never consent to any Treaty of Peace which might be prejudicial to his Right, nor even agree that any third Prince should be establish'd in any of the Spanish Dominions.

Nor have the Declarations of her Majesty and our Parliaments been any way different from the express Words of these Alliances.

In November, 1701. Her Majesty was pleas'd to press the House of Commons for Supplies to support the Alliance she had made for recovering the Monarchy of Spain from the House of Bourbon, and restoring it to the House of Austria. In November 1705. her Majesty told the Parliament, 'Nothing cou'd be more evident, than that if the French King continu'd Master of the Spanish Monarchy, the Ballance of

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of Power in Europe was utterly destroy'd, and he
 wou'd be able in a short time to engross the Trade
 and Wealth of the World. And she was pleas'd
 to say also, ' That no good Englishman cou'd at any
 time be content to sit still and acquiesce in such a
 Prospect! But (she added) that we had then great
 Grounds to hope a good Foundation was laid for
 restoring the Monarchy of Spain to the House of Austria,
 the Consequences of which wou'd not only be safe
 and advantageous, but glorious for England. In the
 same Month the Queen by Message communicated to
 the two Houses the Success in Spain, and the Letter
 she had received from thence, desiring them to con-
 sider of the speediest way for restoring the Monarchy of
 Spain to the House of Austria. In November, 1707,
 at the opening of the first Parliament of Great Britain,
 the Queen was pleas'd to observe with great Satis-
 faction, ' That it was become more easy for all the
 Allies to join their Assistance for enabling the King
 of Spain to reduce the whole Spanish Monarchy to his
 Obedience. For this was still the Point which her
 Majesty had most at heart: And in the February fol-
 lowing she told the House of Commons in Answer to
 their Address, ' That restoring the Spanish Monarchy to
 the House of Austria, was the principal Inducement of
 the present War; and she was sensible, that on the
 Success thereof, not only the Trade and Tranquillity,
 but the Security of Great Britain did in great measure
 depend. Thus the Queen her self was pleas'd to de-
 clare what was the Great End of the Alliances, and of
 the War: nor was it possible for her Majesty more
 fully to express her Sentiments.

The Votes and Resolutions of our Parliaments have
 been also agreeable to her Majesties Declarations from
 the Throne.

The first thing our Parliament resolv'd, after the
 Declaration of this War, was, To return Her Majesty
 their humble Thanks for it: This was done in October,

1702. and in November, 1703. the House of Lords presented an Address, ' Extolling her Majesty's great Zeal, which carried her even beyond the Obligations of Her Treaties in Defence of the House of Austria, and for the glorious Restitution of that Family, to the Monarchy of Spain. And the House of Commons in their Address the same Session, express'd their grateful Sense ' of what her Majesty had done, by engaging the King of Portugal and the Duke of Savoy in the Alliance for recovering the Monarchy of Spain from the House of Bourbon, and restoring it to the House of Austria. In November, 1705. the House of Lords declared, ' That they concurr'd with her Majesty, in her just and noble Sentiments, that no Peace could be lasting, safe and honourable, till the Spanish Monarchy was fix'd in the House of Austria. And the Commons profess'd, ' That they were fully convinc'd, the Balance of Power, in Europe, could never be restored, till the Monarchy of Spain was in Possession of the House of Austria. In November, 1707. the first Parliament of Great Britain declar'd, ' That no Disappointments should discourage them from making their utmost Efforts to enable her Majesty to reduce the whole Spanish Monarchy to the Obedience of the King of Spain. And in December following, both Houses presented an Address to the Queen, in which They humbly offer'd their unanimous Opinion, that no Peace could be honourable or safe for her Majesty, or her Allies, if Spain, or the West Indies, or any Part of the Spanish Monarchy, were suffer'd to remain in the House of Bourbon. And the House of Lords, not content with this, did, in their Address the next Year, assure her Majesty, ' They were more and more convinc'd, that no Peace could be safe and honourable, till the whole Monarchy of Spain was restor'd to the House of Austria.

This has been the Sense of our Parliaments, relating to the Spanish Monarchy: Nor have these been the

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Resolutions of a single Party only, but sometimes one Side was prevalent, and sometimes the other: And however they may have differ'd in other Matters, there has always been, in this Opinion, a steady Agreement of both.

There are also some other Proofs, which shew that her Majesty, and her Allies, thought themselves mutually engag'd to procure the *Restitution of Spain to the House of Austria*: For in the Preliminary Articles, which were concluded by their Ministers, with those of the French King, in the Year 1709. it was, among other Things, agreed, ' That *Charles III.* should be ' acknowledg'd King of all the Territories compr- ' hended under the Name of the Monarchy of Spain. ' That no Prince of the House of France should ever reign in ' Spain, nor acquire any Possessions within the Extent ' of the said Monarchy; and that France should never ' become possess'd of the Spanish Indies, nor send Ships th- ' ther to exercise Commerce, under any Pretext whatsoever. And the States General more particularly in their Reso- lution of the 25th of July, 1710. in which the other Allies concurr'd, did publicly declare, ' That the Allies ' have a Right to demand for the House of Austria the ' Restitution of Spain and the Indies, not only of the ' Duke of Anjou, but principally of the King of France, ' who contrary to Renunciations and solemn Trea- ' ties got Possession of them in the manner universally ' known; who by consequence is obliged to restore ' them; and who, without making any Difficulty, ' promised the Restitution of them, even before the ' first Negotiation was begun: That being the Foun- ' dation upon which all has since been built.

The Particulars hitherto mention'd, are all publick and authentick Acts, not to be denied or disputed; and if any Man should say, That our Parliament went too far in Resolving, That no Peace could be safe whilst any Part of the Spanish Monarchy should remain in the House of Bourbon, since the last Grand Alliance re- quire,

quires no more than a reasonable Satisfaction to the Emperor for his Pretensions to that Monarchy: That Objection is easily answer'd, by looking only into the 21st Article of the Alliance, which was afterwards made, between the Emperor, England, Portugal, and Holland, where it was expressly agreed, That no Peace should at any time be concluded, whilst his most Christian Majesty's second Grandson, by the Dauphin, or any other Prince of French Extraction, should continue in Spain. So that we are as much bound to assist the Emperor in recovering his Right to Spain, as People can be bound by any Treaty: And if no such Obligations were upon us, yet all the World must agree, that as long as the Resolutions of our Parliament before mentioned stand recorded in our Journals, with her Majesties Concurrence to the same, we are absolutely obliged by that to endeavour the Recovery of Spain; for the Resolutions of her Majesty and the Parliament, will always be understood to be our own. And it must needs be remembered, that when the Conferences were held at Gertruydenberg, and there were Hopes of getting over the Difficulties in the 37th Article of the Preliminaries, the Parliament was continued here by short Prorogations, because it was not known but some small Concessions might be thought reasonable to be made to France, for the sake of Peace, which were not strictly within the Meaning of those Resolutions.

This I mention now, to shew the Obligations we then thought our selves under, to adhere to what the Parliament had voted, and her Majesty had confirm'd: And therefore if at any time hereafter it shall be judg'd expedient to make Peace upon other Conditions, it should seem that the Parliament must first be consulted, and that these Resolutions must be first struck out of the Journals.

This was then the Chief End of the War, To recover Spain and the Indies for the House of Austria: And there is but one Reason in the World which should make

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make us submit to an ill Peace, and that is the being beaten every Campaign, and unable to succeed in the Field: But this, I thank God, is the Condition of our Enemies, not our own.

The War has been carried on in *Flanders* with unexpected Success: The French have been beaten there from *Ninove* to *Gambury*: And tho' our Allies were alarm'd last Summer upon the Change of the Ministry, and the Dissolution of the Parliament, yet abroad the Campaign went prosperously on; *Douay*, *St. Venant*, *Arras* and *Reims*, were taken; and at home the Publick Credit was supported and kept from sinking. The Supplies last Winter were effectually granted; the following Campaign was so fortunate, that our Army pass'd the *French Lines*, and penetrated into their Country; and we seem'd to be in the Situation, which we had labour'd to arrive at, by a War of twenty Years, when the World was surpris'd with publick Accounts, *That one Adv. Prince had been in France, and was return'd with a Pass*; and, *That the French were in hopes of Peace*. Thus when our Army had advanced so far, that one Battle, or even one Siege more would in all probability have put a good End to the War; and when another Siege might actually have been made the last Campaign, if no Detachments had been drawn from *Flanders* for the Expedition to *Quebeck*; a secret Negotiation was set on foot between *Britain* and *France*: And it was but too remarkable, that the first Agent employ'd in it went from *Holland*. The Minister residing here from the Emperor, who is so nearly concern'd in this Affair, was kept entirely out of the Secret: Our first Compliments to *France* were return'd by the End of *July*; and a French Agent or two came over and staid here some time; yet the Emperor's Minister had no notice of all this Proceeding till about the middle of *October*; for when it was that the Preliminaries were sent to him. And if we may believe not only the express Words of these

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Article, but all the publick Accounts relating to the whole Affair, the very Foundation of this new Treaty contradicts the chief Ground of the last. For we have lately been inform'd from all hands how well the French Agents were satisfied with their Reception here: What Transports their Countrymen express'd when they came home, and how extremely happy and good-humour'd their King has been ever since. This is a sufficient Proof that they like the Terms of the present Negotiation: For if the Conditions of it had been harder, the People of *Paris* wou'd not have been so gay, nor their Conquer'd King so cheerful. This may therefore be laid down for certain, That as the Affair now stands, the Duke of Anjou is to have Possession of Spain and the West-Indies. All the Comments and Explanations that have been given of the new Preliminaries, in the *Post-Boy* and other Papers, agree in this: Nor have the Persons that are lately come over on a second Embassy brought any Amendment upon this Head to the first Proposal from France. It is whisper'd indeed, that some Addition is offer'd to the Barrier of the Emperor and of the Dutch; that *Dunkirk* is to be demolish'd; and that some more *Ports* and *Castles* are promised to us in the *South-Sea*, and elsewhere: And these are the new Overtures which they say has made the Peace certain: But not a word is mention'd of the Duke of Anjou's quitting Spain: This is so little thought of, that even the *Paris Gazette* dated Nov. 12. in the Article from London has these remarkable Words; 'The 24th *Dispute* were publish'd 'have seven Preliminary Articles, which is affirm'd for 'certain France and England have agreed upon for effecting a General Peace. — Prints have been publish'd here with other Articles, to which no Credit is given.

These Facts being thus fairly stated, and being compar'd with the Proofs collected in the Beginning of this Paper, it is needless to observe to the Reader that the present Negotiations of Peace do not come

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up to the Terms of an Alliance, or to the other Authen-
tic above-mentioned: And therefore I may al-
ready venture to make this Conclusion, That whoever
are for entering into any such Treaty as leaves Spain
and the Indies to France, have neither a due Regard for
Her Majesty's Great Character, nor for the Publick
Declaration of Her Allies, nor for the Resolutions and
the Dignity of our Parliaments.

But there were likewise other good Ends which we
hoped to obtain by this War, besides the Restoration of
Spain. I will mention only two of them: One was,
To secure our own Dominions and Commerce: The other
was, To reduce the Exorbitant Power of France: These
were Conditions so expressly requir'd by the Grand
Alliance, that in any Peace hereafter to be made, all
Persons concern'd in the Transactions of it, will at
least pretend that these great Points are provided for.
But if we give Spain and the Indies to the House of
Bourbon, we shall, in my humble Opinion, be so far
from securing our own Dominions and Commerce, that we
shall expose them to certain Destruction; and we
shall be so far from reducing the Power of France, that
we shall make it for ever Exorbitant; and therefore if
neither the Grand Alliance, nor the Queen, nor the
Parliament, nor the States, had mention'd one word
of the House of Austria; and if no Regard were due to
Justice, to Obligations and to Treaties, yet common
Prudence, and the strong Ties of Interest and Self-
Preservation, should hinder us from giving Spain to
the Duke of Anjou, and from adding new Strength to
France, which has lately push'd so far for Universal
Monarchy.

This appears to be so plain a Proposition, that I
shou'd hardly think there were any Occasion to en-
large upon it, if some People had not different Noti-
ons, who I am willing to believe mean the same
thing. For I find there are many Men among us,
who think we may obtain a tolerable good Peace,

even upon the Terms now propos'd, and the *Spain* and the *Indies* shou'd be given to the *House of Bourbon*: For which Reason I will endeavour to confirm and explain what I have just now said upon that Subject, by considering more at large these following Particulars: First, *The Consequences of the present Negotiation*; and, Secondly, *Some of the Reasons that are given for it*.

First, As to the Consequences of this Negotiation: There is one that must needs be obvious to the whole World; It must certainly dissolve all Trust and Agreement among the Allies; and sure nothing that weakens the Alliance can tend to secure our own Dominions, or to reduce *France*. I have already shewn that there are two things which the Allies have particularly promis'd to perform. One is, *To act jointly and openly with the rest of the Confederates*: The other, *To assist the Emperor in asserting his Right to Spain*: But secret Steps have been now made towards Peace without the Concurrence or Knowledge of all the Parties; and Measures have been taken for Dividing that Succession which the Allies are engag'd to preserve entire. A Design has been laid for disposing of the *Spanish Monarchy* in favour of one who has no Right to it, without the Consent of that Prince whose Succession it is. And the best part of it is allotted to an Enemy, in prejudice of a Friend. This is a Precedent which shou'd never be approv'd of, because no-body knows where it may end, or what secret Bargains may be made for other Kingdoms.

Nor is it enough to say, That all these Negotiations amount to no more than receiving Proposals from *France*, which the *Dutch* themselves have done: For the *Dutch* never courted in the Cabinet those that they had conquer'd in the Field: If Monsieur *Petticorne* went to *France*, it was in an open avow'd manner: And if some little *French Agents* have at any time lurk'd in *Holland*, that Republick ought not to be blam'd for it: Such Wretches will always creep into every Free Coun-

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Country, and I wish there are not too many of them
 at this time unknown and undiscover'd here. But
 such Accidents are of no Weight in the Great Qua-
 sition now before us. Tho' French Spies may have of-
 sen been in *Holland*, the Dutch have never in this War
 sent an Agent to *France*, vested with Authority, to
 propose a shameful Peace. It was the Glory and
 Happiness of the Q—n and her People, that the
 Allies had entire Dependence upon *England*, and that
 she supported with her own Hands the Ballance of
Europe: How then durst any body advise or approve
 new Measures? The French wish'd for nothing but
Spain and the *West-Indies*; 'tis the Prize they have all
 along fought for; and shall they gain it now by
 being beaten nine Campaigns? There is something
 so new and extraordinary in this, that it must needs
 make the Fame of their Negotiators immortal.
 But who will pretend to justify such Proceedings in
 other Places, such unaccountable Turns of Interests
 and Councils? Will not some of the Allies think that
 they are abandon'd by others, and that the Liberties of
Europe are betray'd? Will not the Emperor complain
 that he is neglected by his Friends? Will he not justly
 complain that they had not Patience to see what he
 would offer? What Proofs he would give of his Zeal
 for the Common Cause? What additional Troops
 he would send into the Service? And what further
 Endeavours he would use of all kinds for recovering
 his own Right, and for revenging the Injustice of his
 Enemies? Besides, will not the mysterious manner
 in which some things have been carried, give Grounds
 for Jealousies and Divisions, and make some People
 suspect that there is something wrong at bottom?
 What need had there been talk of a Disguise? Fair
 and just Designs for the Publick Good can always
 bear the Light. But there are some certain Mix-
 tures, which all the World knows were not communi-
 cated but discover'd. And when at last the Secret

was only some *Pamphlets* were then immediately printed in the *Post-Boy*, taken as a Protestation which Men might deliberate, nor as a Sentence which they might obey. The Allies were all alarmed, alarmed and indignant in that Paper: And if any of their Ministers pretended to remonstrate, he was first corrected by that Scribler, and afterwards *Reason* was given for ordering his *Departure*.

But what can all this tend to, but to create Divisions and Jealousies among the Confederates and encourage their Enemies at home and abroad? and to weaken the Grand Alliance? And if once any Breach should happen there, and they should again be obliged to defend themselves from the French, they would then repent when it was too late, that they did not strictly observe the Terms of this Alliance, till they had gained what Great Ends for which it was designed; and it would be as difficult for them hereafter to begin another War, as it would be impossible for them to bring it to so good an Issue. Tho' the Allies have hitherto shew'd a miraculous Firmness in not deserting the Common Cause, it would be in vain to expect they should ever more depend upon one another; Besides, they should in time have seen Interests to pursue, and different Views, if they were not all sold and crush'd by France, which I want to be much more probable, and give over to her.

This is then the first ill Consequence of the present Negotiation as it now stands, when it should have been a Peace. It has sink the Reputation of the Allies, discourag'd their Friends, rais'd the Hopes of their Enemies, and of a treacherous Party among themselves: And it has also engag'd the present Alliance, and made them incapable of ever forming another. These sad Effects in Warlike Affairs, as all impartial Men will witness. But if after these Ad-

vance a Peace should be at last concluded upon the
 Terms propos'd; and Spain should be actually given
 to the Duke of Anjou, the Consequence of that would
 be so fatal to Britain, and to Europe, that every good
 Englishman must tremble at the Thought of it. *Spain*
 will not pretend to say, That the giving *Spain*
 to the Duke of Anjou is directly uniting it to France,
 tho' if either that Prince or the Dauphin should die
 without Children, what could possibly hinder the
 Union of those Crowns? But this I will venture to
 affirm in the mean time; (and no body I believe will
 deny it) that if the Duke of Anjou be seated in that
 Monarchy, he must entirely depend upon the Pro-
 tection of his Grandfather, and be under a Necessity
 of following his Advice, and of promoting his De-
 signs: The French Naval Force must defend his Por-
 tessions in the Indies; the French Ships must convoy
 his Trade and his Gallies; nay the French themselves
 will have a share in both; the whole Expence of the
 War to support the Duke of Anjou in his Throne will
 be charg'd as a Debt upon Spain; Sea ports, Frontier
 Towns, and Settlements in the *Sicily* Sea will be
 made Security for the Payment of it; and a good
 Pretence will never be wanting to seize any part of
 those Dominions.
 For Proof of all this, I need only to mention a
 Treaty concluded between the Duke of Anjou and his
 Grandfather, which has been seen by most foreign
 Ministers of our own and other Nations; by this
 Treaty it is agreed, that France shall be reimbursed
 for all past and future Expences, and new Ports and
 Settlements, with all Advantages of Commerce, are
 given to that Nation in the *West-Indies*. And though
 the Chamber of *Sevil* refus'd for some time to ratify
 this Treaty, yet it is well known, that after the
 Treaty of *Utrecht* they did at last consent to it, on
 Condition that the Dutch King would send an Army
 to support their Monarchy. Upon this the Duke of
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Phelou was commanded to *Spain* with a Body of For-
ces: And it is suppos'd the *French* had before with-
drawn their Troops for this very End, that the *Spani-
sh* might be oblig'd by Necessity and Danger to as-
sue to that Treaty: For the People of *Castile* have so
mov'd an Aversion for those of *Strangers*, that the
French well know; they wou'd rather submit to any
Terms with them, than receive their lawful King at
the Head of his faithful Subjects. And it is also as well
known, that in pursuance of this Treaty, a *French*
Squadron was this Year sent to *Admiralty* to make Pos-
session of the Settlements; which were granted there
to that Nation.

Those therefore that talk of the Duke of *Angou-
leme*'s turning *Spaniard*, amuse us with vain and foolish
Hopes: They might have pleas'd themselves with
such Views two Years ago; but this Treaty has for-
ever put an end to such Dreams. Now at this time, but
we learn from the *Brussels Gazette*, of no bolder a *Diss-
tance* than *November* the 24, that the *Count de Berghijk* the
present Treasurer of *Spain*, who is a *Flaming* by Birth;
and in the Interest of *France*, had just then prevail'd
with the King to grant a new Declaration in favour
of the *French* Trade in *Spain*, and other Parts of that
Kingdom.

The Monarchy then of *Spain* being thus apparent-
ly govern'd by the Councils of *France*, will in effect
be as useful and advantageous to that People, as if it
were absolutely united to their Kingdom. And the
French who never fail to weaken those that depend up-
on them, in order to continue their Subjection, will
have no end in directing the Affairs of *Spain*, but the
Increase of their own Power and Riches: They will
grow every Day more and more formidable, till the
other States of *Europe* are forc'd to submit. For what
can resist the Strength of those two Monarchies, when
their Arms and their Interest shall be united? And
what has not *Europe* to fear from the Power of one
King.

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Kingdom and the Riches of the other, when manag'd by a Prince that knows how to improve all Advantages? What will become of *Britain* in particular, when the *Spaniards* will no longer take off our Manufactures, for which we us'd to have Returns in Bullion? And how shall we be able to manage any other Trade, especially that to the *East Indies*, when we shall have no Supplies of Money from *Spain*?

Nor let us flatter our selves with Hopes, that our new Allies the *French* will continue to us the Enjoyment of this most gainful Commerce: Does any Man imagine that the Liberty of Trading which *France* has obtain'd, will not be exclusive of all other Nations? Will the *French* suffer us to ship our Goods for the *West Indies* on Board the *Galleons*, as we us'd to do, when they themselves shall have sufficient of their own, and will be able to afford them cheaper? Will our new Allies be so generous and good natur'd to let us into a Share of those Advantages, which if they please they may engross to themselves? Is this the Character of the *French* Nation, or have their former Practices given us any Grounds to expect such Grace and Goodness? When a Prince of their own Nation shall be settled in *Spain*, will they not take care that all the Treasures of *America* shall be converted to the Use of *France*? Nay, what Security can we have, even for our own Possessions there, when the *French* shall have the absolute Command of that World? They will certainly be able, with the Assistance of the *Spaniards*, to ruin all our Plantations: They will obtain new Settlements in the North as well as in the South, and from thence they will distress our Northern Colonies, interrupt their Commerce with the Southern, and perhaps destroy them both. This is no more than may reasonably be expected from their present Power in *Canada*, their Influence and Practices upon the *Indians*, and the great Number of their Ships which will every Year increase, while the Fleets of *Great Britain* and *Holland*

Holland will decay. And what will then become of those two Maritime Powers, which have so well supported the common Cause? What will become of the Liberties of *Europe*, so gloriously defended in a War of twenty Years, when the Navy and Troops of *France* shall be paid with the Riches of *Spain*? Then will be the time for *Spain*, with the united Force of *France*, to recover not only *Jamaica*, and our other Possessions in the *West Indies*; but *Portugal*, and the *Seyn* Provinces, to all which they still pretend a Right; and then will be the time for rooting out effectually the most damnable *Northern Heresies*; and for replanting the Catholick Faith, not only in *America*, but in *Europe*.

But all the Consequences of yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou* are so fully shewn in a Pamphlet, entitled, *A Letter to a Member of the Oxford Club*, that I beg the Reader will please to peruse that unanswerable Treatise, in which it is fully prov'd, That the French King by having the Direction of *Spain*, will deprive us of our whole Mediterranean Trade, prohibit the Importation of our Manufactures thither, and the Exportation of their unwrought Wool to us; that He will hinder our annual Supplies of Bullion from *Spain* and the *Spanish Indies*, and from *Portugal* and *Braxile*; that he will take from us the most valuable Branch of our *African* Trade, which serves the *Spaniards* with Negroes, and makes Returns in Bullion; that by giving up *Spain* we shall lose every Year three Millions and an half, which is our present Annual Income by Trade, and would be a Million more if the House of *Austria* had the Monarchy entire; that the Peace desir'd by some Men is worse than the present War by one Million per Annum, and than the Peace we fight for by four Millions per Annum; that by the Loss of *Spain*, and so much of our Trade, all Gentlemen must lose three-fourth Part of the Value of their whole Estates, and those that are in debt

the whole; that therefore it is the Interest of all Orders and Degrees of People, to contribute to the War till Spain shall be recover'd; and that whosoever shall advise the giving it up for a Peace; and the seven hundred and thirty Millions, and an half per Annum for the uncertain Advantages of a South-Sea Trade, deserves to be impeach'd by the general Voice of the Kingdom.

These Points are, as plainly demonstrat'd in that Pamphlet as any thing ever was by Arguments and Figures: And this being the CONSEQUENCES of yielding up Spain, we will now examine some of THE REASONS THAT ARE GIVEN FOR IT, which were propos'd to be next consider'd.

One Reason that has been given for it would indeed be unanswerable, if it were true: It has been said, We ought to make Peace immediately, because we are quite unable to carry on the War any longer. This has been endeavour'd to be fully set forth in a Book, written by one who says he has seen all the Projects for raising Money, and who must therefore be deep in the Secret: And this good Man comes indeed home to the Point, for he declares we have but three things left to do in this World; we must either give a General Pardon, or stop the Ambiguity, or make a Peace. This Doctrine has been publish'd, printed, and reprinted, yet no Body has been complain'd of for it. But sure we are not yet reduc'd to this poor and low Condition! Sure we are at least as able as our Enemies to maintain the War, and much more likely to have Success in it! Tho' I have not the Honour to know the present Schemes and Projects of the Ministers so perfectly well as that Author does, for which Happiness he ought to be envied, yet I am very well assur'd we may still raise sufficient Supplies without a General Ex-

cess for a speedy Peace, &c.

life, or that execrable Notion of *flattering up the Enslaver*, which I little thought ever to have heard of more. And the mentioning it now has had an Effect quite contrary to what was aim'd at by the silly Crafts of those that started it. For instead of frightening the Nation into an ill Peace, it has only rais'd an Indignation against all such Designs and Expedients. But why was not the Author of this Libel confin'd among the Hawkers and Ballad-sellers that were lately put into Custody? Is there more Danger to the Government from a Penny Observer, or a Half-penny Ballad, than from a Book that proposes *flattering up the Enslaver*, and says, *Courtesy Gentlemen will come in to us*? Can there be a greater Reproach to any Administration, than that such Notions should be publickly spread under it? Notions, that tend to nothing but distracting the People and unfixing the Government! There wou'd be no end if I should mention all that might be said upon this Subject; but without making anymore Reflexions either upon the present Condition of our Affairs, or the great Difficulties we may find in providing for the Publick Service, I will venture to affirm, That there is no true *English* man, who has regard to Honour or to Faith, to Obligations, or to Interest, who would not come into any just way for raising Money, rather than consent to such a Peace, as will make us the Reproach of *Europe*, and will tend directly to enslave us all to *France*. And for my one part, I do solemnly declare, with the greatest Sincerity and Truth, That whatever I should had in the World, I would freely give half of it to secure the rest, rather than yield up *Spain* to the House of *Bourbon*; because I do in my Conscience believe, that I should lose the whole by such a Treaty.

Another Reason that is given for yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, is to prevent the annexing that Kingdom to the *Empire*, which, they say, would be as dangerous to the rest of *Europe* as if it were actually

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join'd to *France*. To prove this Assertion, long De-
clarations are made upon the ancient Power of the
House of *Austria*, the Emperor's Titles, and the
Number of his Dominions are set forth at length;
the *Treaty of Partition* made by King *William* is extoll'd
and recommended, and vast Heaps of insignificant
Words are put together; but not one Proof or Argu-
ment is offer'd that has the least Weight in the present
Question. For of what use is it to shew the ancient
Power or Weakness of the House of *Austria*, or of
France, when nothing but their present Condition
should now be enquir'd into, or compar'd together?
Of what use is it to reckon up the Emperor's Titles,
when we only want to know the Strength of his Do-
minions? And how has any Man the Confidence to
talk of King *William's Treaty of Partition*, when all
the World knows that Prince was forced to it con-
trary to his Inclination and Judgment; by the ill Cir-
cumstances of his Affairs both at home and abroad;
That it was the greatest Blemish of his Reign, which
he endeavour'd to wipe off by the *Second Grand Alli-
ance*, form'd directly Contrary to the *Partition*. And
that even in that *Treaty Spain* and the *Indies* were not
given to the House of *Barbours* to wot only 12 years.
But if Men will needs enquire into this ancient
Power of the House of *Austria*, let them set it in
a day Light; and they will find that even *France*
alone has formerly made War against the House of
Austria with various Success; and yet the Republick
of *Holland* was not then form'd, nor had the other
Ten Provinces of *Portugal* revolted also from *Spain*.
So that the Bounds of the Empire and *Spain* were
much larger than they are at present, and those of
France much less. And tho' there was not heretofore any
Moral Force equal to that of *Spain*, yet even their
invincible Armada it self was defeated by Queen *Elizabeth*.
Indeed that Queen had Wife and Honors Mi-
nistery, and they were part of her Defence. But
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what is all this to the present Purpose? Will any Man say the Power of the House of *Austria* was ever so formidable, as a *Conjunction* of *France* and *Spain* would be now? For if they do not prove that, they say nothing. The *King of France* has maintain'd all this War near three hundred thousand Men; and whenever he has pleas'd, he has put out a Fleet at least equal to *One* of the *Dutch*. But what will this Power arise to, when he shall have the whole Produce of *Gold and Silver* in the *Indies*, which no body that is vers'd in such Business will compute at less than *Ten Millions* yearly? What a Fleet and Army will he then be able to maintain? And how can any *Englishman* think of this without Horror? When the whole Power of the House of *Austria*, both in *Germany* and *Spain*, was engag'd against *France* in the last War, with the Assistance of *England* and *Holland*, were not the *French* strong enough for that whole Alliance? What then must they be when *Spain* and the *Indies* shall be taken out of the Scale of the Confederacy, and put into that of *France*? No body, I believe, will say that what we have taken from the *French* by Conquest, is so much as *Spain* and the *Indies*. If the Power then of that Monarchy be added to *France*, will not the *French* be stronger than they were at the beginning of the last War, even tho' we should keep by the Treaty all that we have gain'd by the Sword? This is sure a Demonstration, who ever gives more to another than has been taken from him, must needs make him greater than he was. What then have we been doing these twenty Years? And what is the Fruit of our ten Battles, and of our thirty Sieges, the whole Benefit of which is to be cancell'd by the Dash of a Pen? *France* has in it self a Power more effectual, and fix'd upon more solid Foundations than ever *Spain* had in the utmost Height of that Monarchy. Could *Spain* at any time have withstood such a Confederacy as is now engag'd against

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What is it then we ought not to fear, when the *French* shall be supported by another Monarchy? How easy will it be for them to invade this Country, when they shall not only be Masters at Sea, but shall be able to draw all the Forces from *Spain* to assist them in such an Enterprize? But if that Kingdom be annex'd to the *Empire*, it will be impossible to join the Forces of Both without long Marches by Land, and vast Charge in Transporting them by Sea: Which alone proves the Weakness of those Objections that are made against the Emperor's having *Spain*. For can any thing be so good for us, as that a Prince should be possess'd of that Kingdom and of the *West-Indies*, who must depend upon our Friendship and Assistance? Is there any thing we should so much desire, as that the *West-Indies* should be in the Hands of our good Ally the Emperor, who has no Fleet of his own to send thither? Will not this afford constant Employment for our Shipping, and add great Improvement to our Navigation? Must not a Squadron of our Men of War always attend his Gallies to the *West-Indies*, and protect them in their Return? Nay, have we not a Treaty already made for that purpose with the New Emperor, of infinite Advantage to our Nation, and highly for the Honour of the General that made it? Is there any way but this to cut off the Sinews of War from *France*? And does any body in earnest think we shall be in Danger from the House of *Austria*, if they should possess those Dominions? The Extent of the *Spanish* Monarchy is so wide and distant, that one part can hardly relieve or assist another, nor the Whole make the Emperor's Power exorbitant: And he is so far from being absolute in the Empire it self, that the Treaty of *Westphalia*, which restores all the Electors and States to their ancient Prerogatives, has extremely reduc'd his: Not to mention the great Support which the Protestant Interest now has in *Germany*, from the Protection of the King

King of Prussia, the House of ~~Habsburg~~, and other neighbouring Princes. How comes it then that the Emperor is grown of a sudden so formidable, and that France is the only Kingdom that we are not at all afraid of? When our united Friends the *Sets* had got a small Settlement in the *West-Indies*, what terrible Alarms was this Nation under, and how restless and unhappy were we till our good Fellow-Subjects and Fellow-Protestants were dispossess'd! Yet now we hear of French Settlements there with the greatest Calmness and Content of Mind. What Charm is it that we are under, which makes us so insensible of our approaching Ruin! What is the fatal Secret that has put us into this Lethargy! The Power of the House of Austria has declin'd ever since the Reign of Philip the Second, and now at last we are grown afraid of it: The Power of France has been increasing all that while, and had almost overthrow'n the rest of Europe, yet now we begin to think it harmless, and are willing to trust it with the Riches of both Worlds. If the Emperor were to morrow possess'd of Spain, it would be impossible for him to keep it, or to maintain a Communication between that Realm and Germany without the Use of our Ships. And when the Dominions of the French were less than at this time, they were able to wrest the Netherlands from the House of Austria, as was found by fatal Experience. But if that House could not keep its Possessions in Europe or America, when it was in much greater Power, what have we to fear from it in the present Circumstances? And what have we not to fear from France, which still maintains so obstinate a War against almost all the rest of Europe? In short, if Spain be given to the Duke of Anjou, the whole Affairs and Commerce of that Monarchy will be manag'd by France: If it is restor'd to the House of Austria, the Trade must be chiefly carried on by Sea with England and Holland, except the little that may be had with Portugal. And

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Since the Emperor has not a Sea-port or a Ship in the World, he must for ever be oblig'd to those that have. In the first Case, all the Gold and Silver of the *Indies* will be carried into *France*: In the second, we shall at least have the Trade of *Old Spain*, with new and great Advantages; and our Ships will at least be the Convoys of all the Treasures of *America*.

But this is so very plain a Case, and there is something so very offensive in the Confidence of those Men who would fright us in the Emperor's Power, that I am ashamed of having said so much upon this Argument; because it is certain, that if we could immediately give that Prince Possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, we ought in reason still to wish for more Strength to be added to him, that the Ballance of Power might be kept equal between the *Empire* and *France*; and that *We*, or the *Dutch*, might be able to cast it on either side. What therefore must we think of those Men who wou'd take away from the Weight of the House of *Austria*, and add it to *France*, which was before so much too heavy? This is a Proposal so treacherous and dishonest, as well as contrary to Common Sense, that I have often wonder'd how it has been possible to engage so many unhappy Men to expose themselves in Writing upon that Subject: For I think the sole Glory of displaying our Danger from the Emperor, shou'd have been left to that Author who writ the *Tale of a Tub*; And the same Title wou'd have serv'd for his Treatise upon this Argument. A Man who to please the very worst Men among us, the *Deists*, *Socinians*, and *Free-Thinkers*, made a Satyr upon Religion, is the only fit Person to be employ'd in such Drudgery of Scribbling; and it wou'd be Impudence in a Clergyman who has ridicul'd Christianity, to pretend after that to stick at any thing else. This Province therefore shou'd have been kept entire for him, and the shameless *Review* shou'd have been forbid to meddle with it; for he brings great

great Distract upon his present Masters, they should ring so publicly for Peace and the *Præcedent*. I know I will mention but one Reason more, which is given for yielding up Spain; and that is, the Assurance of some of great Advantages in the *South Sea* and *India*, which we are to gain by a Treaty with *France*. But of all the Impositions endeavour'd to be put upon our Understandings, this is sure the hardest: when we hear Men talk of Treaties with the King of *Spain*, and of that King's doing both *good* and *amirably like a good and just Ally*; when we hear *Spain* to be given in one Place; *Guinæa* to be receiv'd in another, *Madagascar* to be demolish'd in a third, and all this upon the *Faith* and *Honour* of that Monarch, we may be sure those that say these things intend only to deceive others, since it is impossible they should do so grossly deceiv'd themselves. Did ever the King of *France* perform any one thing that he promis'd by a Treaty? Nay, did he ever make use of Promises, or even Oaths, for any other End than to ensnare the People that had to do with him? Did he ever propose a Congress with any other View, than to break Confederacies, disarm his Enemies, or lay Foundations for some future War? And is it necessary to give any other Proof of this, than barely to recollect all that has pass'd on the part of that Nation, from the *Pyrenean* Treaty to the late King of *Spain's* Will? What therefore can People mean by depending on the Treaties of such a Prince?

But it is said we shall have real and effectual Security for the just Performance of the present Treaty, and therefore we need to be in no Pain about the Insincerity of the *French*. But who, I wou'd be glad to know, shall be the Guarantees of this Treaty, if ever it shou'd take effect? In every Guarantee there shou'd be a sufficient Power and Strength to warrant the Execution of the Agreement. But will there be a Power

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Power in *Europe* great enough to oblige the *French* King to a due Observance of this? It is plain, the Strength of the present Confederacy was but just sufficient to contend with him; what then will it be when any one of the Allies shall fail, or be subdued, and new Kingdoms shall be added to *France*? If the same Union should continue among the Confederates, and if that would make them as strong as *France* join'd with *Spain*, both which are impossible, as I have already shewn; yeeven in that Case the Strength of Confederates could never have an equal Weight to the same Strength under one direct Management. But what is still worse, we have no reason to hope that our Allies would engage themselves in a new War to make good our Treaty with *France*. If such a Peace should be made as is now propos'd, our Friends wou'd have Work enough at Home to protect their own Dominions, or rather to make Terms for themselves; and therefore our Treaty of Commerce wou'd only expose us to the Scorn and Derision of our Enemies.

But what is it we in earnest propose to get by this Treaty? Does any Man seriously believe that the *French* and *Spaniards* will give us lasting Settlements in the *South-Sea*? Or have we so much as a Scheme propos'd for carrying on that imaginary Traffick? We have indeed a Company erected, and an ample Charter pass'd, but no body cou'd ever yet hear what was to be done in pursuance of it; which is thought the best part of the Management. Some Projects cannot be kept too long a Secret. But this we know already, and may surely depend upon it, that when-ever we shall venture to send Ships to those Regions, we shall not only be oppos'd by the *Spaniards* and the *French*, but by the Natives also, who are inveterate Enemies to us and our Religion: And the best we can hope for will be no more than some momentary Settlement, as useful perhaps and enriching as that of the *Scots* upon

Darien. This will certainly be the Height of our Acquisitions in the *South-Sea*.

But I have still something further to observe upon this Head ; for it is my humble Opinion, that if we cou'd obtain either by *Treaty* or by *Conquest* those *Golden Mines* we dream of, they wou'd not be half so advantageous to us, as the bare Liberty of Trading there, and of exchanging our Goods for Bullion. This is the proper Business of our Country : Thus our People are employ'd, our Manufactures are improv'd, and our Constitution is preserv'd : But this I have shewn the *French* will never grant : And the Gold or Silver Mines, if we cou'd have them, wou'd only destroy our Industry, and make us such a lazy Generation as the *Spaniards*. Those Treasures may be proper to over-turn a Free Government, or to support a Tyranny ; and therefore *France* may well be fond of them, where great Armies are to be maintain'd, great Bribes are to be provided, and universal Servitude is design'd for the rest of *Europe*. But Trade and Liberty are all we want or wish for : And those that amuse us with a *South-Sea* Project, and Settlements in *America*, if they have any other Meaning than a distant Banter, are only forming such Designs, as in other Countries have debas'd the Spirits of the People, or have made the Crown independent.

This is the most we should get by our new Settlements, our *Porto-bello*, and such like Places, if ever they shou'd be convey'd to us upon the firm Security of the *French* King's Faith and Honour : They are Places which we could not keep if we would ; and which would certainly hurt us if we could : As the Garrisons at *Cadix* and elsewhere would be a dangerous Force in Times of Peace, a just Occasion of Jealousie in the People, and wholly inconsistent with the Nature of our Government ; so that the more Forts we shou'd obtain, the worse it would be for us ; because they would require a standing Army. Yet these are the in-

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inestimable Benefits that the French propose to us in order to obtain a Congress; which they have so long impatiently desir'd. For they know very well the Advantage they have at such Conferences; and every body else knows the Danger of *Many* treating with *One*, and the Disagreements and Quarrels that have generally attended such Meetings. And 'tis with this View chiefly that the French desire to treat, that they may once more have an Opportunity to exercise their Talent of *Intreagu*ing, which was always reckon'd one of their chief Perfections, and which has appear'd in so wonderful a manner upon many Occasions, that it is well known to the whole World, they have often perswaded even Princes themselves to act in Opposition to their own true Interest. But I will trouble the Reader no further upon this Head.

Having thus gone thro' the Particulars I mention'd, and consider'd the *Consequences* of yielding up *Spain* to the D. of *Anjou*, with *some of the Reasons* that are given for it, I will now add, in the last Place, That since it cannot be suppos'd her M——y will conclude an Affair of the highest Moment, without taking the Opinion of her Parliament, I am in no great Apprehension of so dangerous a Peace. The Representatives of this Nation are incapable of acting against themselves; or of giving any Advice which is not for the Good of their Country, for the Honour and Support of her M——y, and for the entire Satisfaction of our Allies. Nor would I be thought by this to dispute the Prerogative of the Crown, in making War or Peace; both are her Majesties undoubted Right: But as she was graciously pleas'd to communicate to her Parliament her Intention to make War, the same Wisdom and Goodness will incline her M——y to consult them in the difficult Negotiations of Peace; not to mention again the *Votes* and *Addresses* that stand in Opposition to the *Treaty* now propos'd, and must be *revers'd* before our Ministers can proceed in Safety; even upon the Foot of the old *Preliminaries*,

mineries, and the Explanation of the 37th Article. And since we are already to treat with the *French* again, why should it not still be upon those Preliminaries? And if any one of these Articles be thought too hard, why should not that be the Subject of the Treaty, rather than such a new Set of Preliminaries, as unravel all that has been doing these twenty Years? Why should *Spain* and the *Indies* be now required for the Duke of *Anjou*, when no more was ask'd for him at the last Congress than a small Dominion in *Sicily*, and the Isles adjacent? If a Partition were reasonable to be made, which I have proved it is not, yet why should that Prince have the best Part of the Monarchy? And why should the Confederates be brought to such undue Compliances? Tho' I regard not the Rumour dispers'd in foreign Prints of great Sums of Money remitted from *France* to other Places; yet every body must think it wou'd be an unaccountable End of our long and prosperous War, if we shou'd tamely give up the very thing we have been fighting for. Can this be properly call'd, *Securing our Dominions and Commerce*? Or will any body say in earnest that *France* is reduced, when *Spain* and the *Indies* shall be added to it? Is there any Man that thinks at all, and that sees or hears what is doing in the World, who is not amaz'd at the avow'd Friendship between *Britain* and *France*, which the *Post-Boy* gives us accounts of? In his Supplement of Nov. 23. he takes care to inform us, That the *French King* had repeated his Orders in the Ports to give the *English Ships* all manner of Protection, and Assurance that they have nothing to fear; and that the Report which had been spread to the contrary was groundless and malicious. And the same Paper has also these Words; It is said that the King has sent to the Queen of Great Britain by the Marquis de Gournay, six compleat Suits, very rich, which he caus'd to be made on purpose. French Stuffs for the Queen of Great Britain! A noble Present truly; But what does this Man mean by dispersing such wild Rumours?

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article. And again, why is it? And if so hard, why easy, rather unravel all. Why should the Duke of the last Campaign the Isles add to be made, should that. And why undue Compensers'd in submitted from must think our long give up the this be pro-merce? Or duced, when is there any ears what is the avow'd ch the Pest- of Nov. 23. h King had English Ships they have no- en spread to nd the same he King has Marquis de b he caus'd e Queen of what does Rumours? What

What does he mean by talking of the Peace as a thing already done? Such a Treaty as he mentions might have been made at the Beginning of the War, and that we now accept such a Peace at *Bouchain* as we might have had under the Walls of *Nimagueu*! What makes the Fellow write at this mad rate? and why is he for giving such Benefits to *France*? There must be some Mystery in this, which Time only can lay open. It is true indeed that Kingdoms have often been betray'd and ruin'd by ill Ministers, and nothing ought more to be fear'd by any People, than that crafty and wicked Men shou'd at any time get into Power: But that is far from being our Case: Our Misfortune is without Example, because too many of us wou'd feign undo our selves; and we court our own Ruin as an apparent Good. We are so enchanted, or rather poison'd with the Name of Peace, that we do not see the Mischief which the *French* have speciously cover'd under it; but we are perswaded to desire it our selves. This must be own'd by all the World to be a Master-Game in their Managers: By these Arts and silent Practices they have engaged too many of us to declare for the House of *Bourbon*, and to exclude the Emperor from those Dominions to which he is entitl'd by all kind of Rights and Settlements.

Nor is this a new Scheme set on foot since the late Emperor's Death; which some will pretend was the Occasion of the present Measures: This Peace was projected long before he died, as appear'd not only by the weekly Examiners and other Papers; but also more particularly by the gross Neglect of *Spain*, even since the present Ministers had a General of their own in that Service. For tho' at the opening of the last Sessions of Parliament, the Queen was pleas'd to recommend a vigorous Prosecution of the War in all Places, and particularly in *Spain*: Tho' that War seem'd to be the principal Care of the Administration at that time; and tho' an Estimate larger

ger than in any former Year, was given into the House of Commons for the Expence of that War in the Year 1711, and the Money was voted accordingly; yet it will appear upon Examination that very small Supplies have been remitted to *Spain* in the last fourteen Months, notwithstanding her Majesty's express Care of that Service, and the Parliaments chearful and large Provision for it. And how great an Aggravation will it be of this Neglect, if hereafter it shall be shewn that for want but of a moderate Supply, Opportunities were lost this Year of making a successful Campaign in that Country; and that if we cou'd have brought our Army into the Field, we shou'd not have been oppos'd by the Enemy, who were in the utmost Want of Necessaries of all kinds. What Account therefore can be given of this Management, but that the War was purposely neglected in *Spain* to give a plausible Pretence for yielding up that Monarchy by a Peace? And what did we mean in making great Instances to keep King *Charles* in *Catalonia*, for fear we should lose our Footing there, when at the same time we were carrying on a Treaty with the French for surrendring to them the whole Kingdom?

The Proceeding of the new *M—rs* in this Affair, has made me often think of the Censure pass'd upon the old ones last Winter in the House of Lords for having greatly neglected the Service of *Spain*, which I am now convinc'd, was never neglected till this Year. For it plainly appears by a late Book, call'd, *An Impartial Enquiry into the Management of the War in Spain*, that the Service there was rather over-supply'd. And even in the Year 1710, which was the last of that *M—ry*, of twelve hundred and thirty thousand Pounds given by Parliament for the Service of *Spain*, at least eleven hundred thousand Pounds were issued and applied to that Use by the 8th Day of *August*: Tho' nothing is more known than that twelve hundred thousand Pounds of the whole Supply granted in that Year, were upon

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Funds so extremely remote, that no Money cou'd at that time be borrow'd upon them in *England*.

This, and many more Considerations, shew the unhappy Mistakes that Men are carried into by Faction and Party, by private Animosities or selfish Views: Therefore it were to be wish'd, that whatever Words were formerly us'd to distinguish Parties, there should now be no more Remembrance of them, but that Men on both Sides wou'd forget all past Offences, and unanimously Consult for their present Safety. The Letters from *Paris* tell us, there is nothing the *Marschal Tallard* boasts so much of, as the great Advantages he made of our Divisions and Animosities. But both Parties have now an Opportunity of shewing He mistook his Account, and of convincing the French, that our foolish Distinctions at home, will prove of no use to their Cause. And both Parties have now also an Opportunity of clearing themselves to one another and the whole World, of all those ill Designs which have been rashly charg'd upon them, by some Factioned Men of each Side. Surely it is now time to think of other Matters, than whether *Tories* or *Whigs* shall prevail in the Court or in the Parliament: Things shou'd surely now be regarded, and not Men: This is not a Party — but a National Concern; and when every thing that is dear to us is at Stake, Expedients of Union shou'd rather be found out, than Differences of Opinion regarded. Is this a Time to quarrel about the Rights of the Prerogative, or of the Parliament, when both are in danger of being swallow'd up? Is this a Time to dispute about Resistance and Revolution Principles, when we have reason to dread another Conquest? Surely the present Juncture of Affairs, shou'd oblige all honest Men to come to a right Temper of Agreement and Confidence among themselves; will those that have the Interest and Weight in our Two Parties, suffer others of no Party, of no Interest, to prevail over them, purely

purely by the Power of Court Favour, and the dangerous Vertue of their Offices? This I hope will never happen in *Great Britain*: Nor ought any Distinction now to remain among us, but of those that are for making a *Ruinous Peace*, and of those that are for saving the *Liberties of Europe*. And since an Alliance is now form'd, which by the Blessing of God is strong enough to reduce our Enemy, if we do not effectually subdue him now, we shall be answerable for all the Calamities and Destructions, which shall hereafter fall upon us or our Posterity.

Let us therefore cheerfully prosecute the War, till the Two Ends I mention'd are obtain'd: Till our own *Dominions are secured*, and the *Power of France is reduced*. The present Emperor being more nearly oblig'd than his Brother was to preserve his footing in *Spain*, and to support his good Subjects the *Catalans*, may very reasonably agree to maintain a greater Force in *Italy*; especially since there is now no occasion for so many Troops in *Hungary*. And by having constantly a good Army in *Italy*, some Regiments may always be ready to send to *Catalonia*, when ever they shall be wanted for that Service, where 'tis propos'd to be only upon the Defensive: And the same Forces wou'd likewise be at hand to assist the *Duke of Savoy's* Army in acting either Offensively or Defensively, as the Posture of the Enemy on that side, shou'd make it most reasonable. There is not much ground to apprehend that this Proposition should be disapprov'd by the Emperor; and if, besides this, his Imperial Majesty can be induced at the instance of the other Allies, fully to execute his Treaty with the *Duke of Savoy*, there is no reason to doubt that Prince's Concurrence with them in such Operations of the War, as shall be thought most useful to the Common Cause, in the Year 1712. And this Scheme being agreed on, and resolv'd to be put in Execution, wou'd leave room for *England* and *Holland* to save the next Year more than half the Charge of the War in *Spain*,
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and wou'd also enable them to bring the *Prussian*, and
Sax Gotta Troops hitherto employ'd in *Italy*, into *Flan-
ders*, where we may justly hope they may be able to make
a greater Impression upon *France*. And if by this
scheme, *England* may save one Million a Year of the
Expence we have hitherto been at; this is sure a good
Argument, why we still shou'd continue the War, ra-
ther than lose all the Fruit and Advantage of so many
great Successes in it.

This is what may reasonably be expected from the
Emperor; besides an increase of his Forces on the
Rhine. The *Dutch* declare also, that they are willing
to make greater Efforts than ever; and our Enemies
by the vast Expence they have been at in a War of
Twenty Years; by the Ruin of all their Credit; by
the mighty Rise of Interest, and the frequent recoin-
ing their Money; and above all, by the Loss of so
many Battels, and strong Fortresses have not only
wasted their Country, but even sunk their Courage:
They dare not Face our Armies in the Field, and no-
thing but the *Indies* can recruit their Treasury: And
shall we therefore give them Possession of that Coun-
try? And that too, when our Troops are on the
Frontiers of their own? When one blow more wou'd
make them uneasy even at *Paris*, and when we may
justly hope from a short Perseverance in War to have
the Blessing of Peace attended with Safety?

But let no Body use this as an Argument, that the
French are sufficiently reduc'd; they are reduc'd, 'tis
true, if we make a good Peace, deprive them of the
Spanish Monarchy, and confine them within the Bounds
they are now beaten into. But if *Spain* and the *In-
dies* shou'd at last be given them, a new War wou'd
certainly break out in Three Years; the *French*
and *Spaniards* wou'd be in Arms before any of their
Neighbours wou'd suspect them; and they wou'd
soon be as able as ever to take Possession of *Flan-
ders* in one Day, which we know they have once done
already.

already. What wou'd then become of the *Dutch Barrier*, which is our own Security as well as theirs? For there is a mutual Stipulation for our *Protestant Succession*, and for their *Barrier* in the very same Treaty: A Treaty which has lately been much complain'd of, and with good Reason by some People, because it stood in the way of a *Treaty* of their own. But what will become of that or any other Security, when the French shall have destroy'd the Barrier it self? And what will then hinder them from restoring the Pretender, and establishing in *Great Britain*, not only his Government but their own? What other meaning cou'd there be in the Compliment, that was made by the *Dauphin* to the late *Queen of England*? The *Paris Gazette* it self mentions the Joy he was pleas'd to wish her upon the News of our approaching Peace. What Joy cou'd that be to her, but as it laid a Foundation for her Son's Advancement?

Shall we then not pursue the War till the Hopes of that Family are extinguish'd? This we ought certainly to do, in Duty to her Majesty, if we had no Regard or Concern for our selves: And therefore, tho' I must own we are under great Discouragements; tho' it appears that more Credit has been lost this Year than ever, and more Money squander'd away; tho' it appears that the Nation has paid too much for advancing some Men to great Places; and tho' there is hardly one thing complain'd of in the Representation of the House of Commons which has not since been repeated; and even the old Commissioners of Victualling have been suffer'd to *contract on* till very lately; yet notwithstanding all this I cannot have the least Fear, or Doubt, but the Parliament will effectually provide for the publick Service, till such Concessions are granted by *France* as shall appear just and reasonable to the whole Confederacy. The Cause we are engag'd in, is great and just: 'Tis the Cause of Truth and Liberty; then let us not basely desert or betray it. How welcome soever Peace would be to

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to us, which I believe is equally desir'd by all Orders and Parties in the Nation ; yet every Body must know that an ill Peace is worse than War it self : And I hope there are not above *ten Men* in the Nation, for whom *Peace* at any rate is absolutely necessary ; and those *ten Men* shall be nameless.

I have now humbly offer'd all I have to say upon this Subject : I have shewn by *authentick Proofs*, the *Opinion* of her *Majesty*, of her *Allies*, and of our *Parliaments*, That no *Peace* ought to be made, till *Spain and the Indies* are restor'd to the *House of Austria*. I have endeavour'd also to shew, that the present *Negotiation* is dangerous to the *Confederacy* as it now stands ; and wou'd be destructive to *Europe* if it should end in an ill *Peace* : That the *Reasons* which are given for concluding the *War* are frivolous and false : That we are still more able than our *Enemies* to maintain it, and ought to do so at any *Expence* till we are safe : That the *Fear* of the *Emperor's* *Power* is the most groundless and senseless *Dream* that ever was endeavour'd to be put upon the *World* : And that the *South-Sea Project*, which has drawn us into all this *Misery* and *Folly*, cannot possibly take *Effect*, and would do us no good if it succeeded : And now I will beg leave to draw from the whole, this short *Conclusion*, That the present *Proposals of Peace*, or any future *Proposals of what kind soever*, THAT SHALL LEAVE *SPAIN AND THE INDIES TO THE HOUSE OF BOURBON*, ought by every true *English-man* to be rejected with *Scorn and Indignation*.

F I N I S.